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Abstract
Previous research in the areas of social, expert witness, and child witness psychology has found
evidence for a multiple factor model of witness credibility. While a multiple factor model has not yet
been tested with adult witnesses who are not experts, results from previous credibility research suggest
that there may be at least two components of adult witness credibility: perceived cognitive accuracy and
perceived honesty. The current study utilized a 3 x 3 (Perceived Cognitive Accuracy [neutral, medium,
low] x Perceived Honesty [neutral, medium, low]) design to assess effects on witness credibility,
verdicts, and likelihood of commission scores. Participants were 383 students from the University of
Texas at El Paso. A confirmatory factor analysis showed two factors of credibility: perceived cognitive
accuracy and perceived honesty. Based on these results, scales of cognitive accuracy and honesty for
adult witnesses were developed. Inconsistent witnesses showed greater deficits on the cognitive
accuracy scale, and witnesses with a prior criminal record showed greater deficits on the honesty scale.
In addition, greater cognitive accuracy and honesty scores predicted more guilty verdicts. While further
study is needed in order to generalize these findings across other trial scenarios and manipulations, the
current study provides the field with a reliable and valid measure of the two central components of adult
witness credibility.
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Introduction
Adult Witness Credibility: A Two-Factor Model
Eyewitness testimony plays a major role in criminal trials and a primary concern for
lawyers is whether or not their witness appears credible to the jury. In order for jurors to put trust
into a witness’s statement, they must find the witness reliable or credible. In the case of Neil v.
Biggers (1972), the Supreme Court identified five criteria that should be taken into consideration
by the jury when deciding the reliability or credibility of a witness; these are: the witness’s
certainty in their identification, how well witnesses were able to view the suspect, how well
witness’s description of the suspect matched the appearance of the suspect, how much attention
witnesses paid to the suspect, and how much time elapsed between witnessing the event and
making an identification. Research in this area has focused on how the Biggers criteria, as well
as additional factors, influence mock-juror credibility ratings and verdicts (e.g., Berman &
Cutler, 1996; Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995; Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009; Tenney, MacCoun,
Spellman, & Hastie, 2007; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986).
Research in the area of eyewitness credibility was influenced by early source credibility
studies (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland,
1953; McGinnies & Ward, 1980). Recognizing the need to expand these findings to additional
sources, researchers began examining perceived credibility of eyewitnesses in the courtroom.
The main goal of eyewitness credibility research has been to build a substantial body of studies
that can inform the public, judges, and lawyers on how jurors make credibility decisions. To do
this, research often examines criteria outlined in Neil v. Biggers (1972) and actual court cases
and investigates their affect on credibility ratings and verdicts in a scientific, controlled manner.
For example, certainty in identification, as defined by confidence, has been found to increase
credibility ratings and result in more guilty verdicts (Whitley & Greenberg, 1986). Despite this,
1

confidence has not been found to be predictive of accuracy under most circumstances (Fisher &
Cutler, 1995). In addition to confidence, accuracy of witness’s descriptions has not been shown
to be related to successful identification of the suspect (Pigott & Brigham, 1985). Rather,
reporting more details of the suspect’s appearance has been linked to identification accuracy
(Sporer, 1996). Research on opportunity to view the suspect and amount of attention paid to the
suspect by witnesses suggests that these criteria may be related to accuracy, but because
witnesses tend to overestimate the amount of time they were able to view the crime (Loftus,
Schooler, Boone, & Kline, 1987), relying on these criteria may not be useful in predicting
accuracy. Finally, it has been established that the longer the retention interval between the time
of the witnessed event and the identification, the more likely it is for witnesses to be inaccurate
(Deffenbacher, Bornstein, McGorty, & Penrod, 2008). Other factors, such as inconsistencies
made during testimony, have also been shown to be negatively related to credibility ratings
(Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman et al., 1995), but not predictive of actual witness accuracy
(Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Lusczc, 1999).
Overall, research suggests that most of the five Biggers criteria, and other factors such as
inconsistencies made during testimony, have only limited validity in predicting accuracy of
witness’s identifications. Despite the limited validity of these factors, jurors still tend to rely on
witness characteristics, such as confidence and inconsistencies, when making credibility
judgments. Research is needed in order to establish which witness characteristics are most
important to jurors in making credibility judgments and how these characteristics ultimately
affect verdict decisions. Practically speaking, lawyers may also be interested in learning which
witness characteristics are more likely to lead to higher credibility and verdicts in their favor.
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Although lawyers certainly have some notions on how jurors form credibility judgments,
research is needed to substantiate these ideas.
In order to understand the juror decision making process behind perceived credibility,
research is first needed to establish a valid scale with which credibility can be measured. One
problem in the adult witness credibility area is that the methods used to measure perceived
credibility vary widely. A valid and reliable scale of credibility has not yet been created or tested.
Some studies have used only a one-item scale of “credibility” to measure credibility, and that
may make it difficult to draw conclusions based on the findings. Further, evidence from social
psychology, expert witness testimony, and child witness domains suggest that credibility consists
of at least two components relating to cognitive ability and honesty (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz,
1969; Brodsky, Griffin, & Cramer, 2010; Hovland et al., 1953; McCroskey, 1966; McCroskey &
Jenson, 1975; Ross, Jurden, Lindsay, & Keeney, 2003; Singletary, 1976; Whitehead, 1968).
Cognitive components often include items such as intelligence, memory, and accuracy, and
honesty components often include items such as believability and trustworthiness. Studies have
yet to examine whether credibility is similarly multidimensional for adult witnesses.
It would be beneficial to test the multiple factor model of credibility with adult witnesses
in order to refine current credibility measures and to identify whether witness characteristics
affect one or both of the credibility factors. The current study will attempt to examine whether a
two-factor model of perceived credibility (henceforth, this will be referred to as credibility) is
applicable to adult witnesses and will try to selectively influence each factor by manipulating
witness characteristics related to perceived cognitive accuracy and perceived honesty
(henceforth, these factors will be referred to as cognitive accuracy and honesty).
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Early Credibility Research
Eyewitnesses in the courtroom are just one of the many different types of sources that can
be studied in conjunction with credibility. Psychological research on source credibility began
with Carl Hovland around the time of World War II (Severin & Tankard, 1997); eyewitness
credibility is an extension of Hovland’s early research with source credibility. For Hovland,
source credibility was only a small part of an overarching theory of persuasion that was
developed by himself and his colleagues in order to understand the power of war-time
propaganda and attitude change. They believed that persuasion, or attitude change, occurred
according to the rules of learning theory. In addition, they believed that there are three areas of
importance to persuasion: the message, the audience, and the source. All three areas were key
components to induce attitude change. As it pertains to the source, Hovland and colleagues
believed that a credible source was needed in order to persuade the listener to change his or her
opinion. Research continued in all three areas, and the current study will focus on the credibility
of sources and the underlying components of credibility.
Early research on source credibility began within the Research Branch of the US Army.
Hovland’s team conducted experimental and evaluation studies on the success of film and print
media meant to prepare and inspire US soldiers during World War II (Severin & Tankard, 1997).
One of these evaluation studies focused on a radio personality who was able to garner pledges
for $39 million worth of war bonds. Researchers believed that the radio personality’s perceived
credibility was crucial to her ability to bring in so many pledges. After evaluating the radio
program, they concluded that her credibility included the components of perceived
trustworthiness and sincerity. Rather than relying on an evaluation study of one source, Hovland
and colleagues then began studying credibility through a series of experimental studies (for
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review, see Hovland et al., 1953). They eventually concluded that the two components of
credibility most important to persuasion were expertise and trustworthiness. Hovland’s research
heavily influenced other areas of credibility research to include various types of sources, such as
consumer (e.g., Goldsmith, Lafferty, & Newell, 2000; Ohanian, 1990) and media (e.g., Kiousis,
2001) research.
The components of trustworthiness and expertise were tested individually in source
credibility research in order to ascertain which component has a larger impact on overall
credibility decisions. Mixed results have been found; for example, McGinnies and Ward (1980)
sampled cross-cultural participants and manipulated trustworthiness and expertise of a speaker.
Results showed that across all samples a trustworthy individual was more likely to produce
attitude change in the promoted direction compared to an untrustworthy individual, regardless of
expertise. In contrast, other studies have found only an influence for sources that are considered
both experts and trustworthy (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953). It is
important to note that these earlier studies did not include a reliable and validated scale to
measure trustworthiness or expertise and this could have affected results; the current study will
address this problem. In addition, it is also important to recognize that any effects or scales
created for credibility of one source may not be applicable when examining a different type of
source (McCroskey & Jenson, 1975). Therefore, it may be necessary to create unique measures
or scales for a variety of sources; the current study will also address this potential problem.
Hovland’s early research not only stimulated media and consumer research, but also
credibility involving eyewitnesses in the courtroom. With so many court cases involving and
even relying upon eyewitness testimony for a conviction, psychologists began investigating the
factors that jurors use to decide credibility. As previously described, many characteristics were
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found to affect credibility ratings; however, the actual measurement of adult witness credibility
has not yet been addressed by researchers and still remains to be a problem.

Witness Credibility Measures
Previous research examining the credibility of adult witnesses has commonly measured
credibility using only one item. Participants are simply asked if the witness or witness’s
testimony appeared credible or not, usually on a seven point Likert scale (e.g., Bollingmo,
Wessel, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2008; Bollingmo, Wessel, Sandvold, Eilertsen, & Magnussen,
2009; Borckardt et al., 2003; Dahl et al., 2007; Kaufman, Drevland, Wessel, Overskeid, &
Magnussen, 2003; Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989; Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009). These studies have
found that characteristics such as displaying emotions incongruent with the type of crime
committed (Bollingmo et al., 2008; Bollingmo et al., 2009; Dahl et al., 2007; Kaufman et al.,
2003), having more witness statements proven false by lawyers (Borckardt, Sprohge, & Nash,
2003), and being a child witness (Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989) or a child bystander witness
(Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009) reduced credibility ratings. While several studies have attempted to
separate credibility into two components, by measuring both credibility of a witness and
credibility of the witness’s testimony (Bollingmo et al., 2008; Kaufman et al., 2003), again, a
one-item scale was used to measure both. It is important to note that these studies may be limited
in drawing conclusions about factors influencing credibility because of their reduction of the
credibility measure to only one item. A one-item scale may not be accurate in measuring a
complex construct such as credibility. A more nuanced measure of credibility may require more
than one scale in order to better understand credibility and its underlying components.
Other studies have departed from a one-item scale by using multiple scales to measure
credibility, including honesty, believability, trustworthiness, cognitive ability, and accuracy
6

(Frumkin, 2007; Lindholm, 2008; Mueller-Johnson, Toglia, Sweeney, & Ceci, 2007; Newcombe
& Bransgrove, 2007; Tenney et al., 2007); however, the main goals of these studies were not to
examine factor components of credibility, so an average of the items was used as a credibility
measure or each item was analyzed separately. Again, this is not the best method in order to
understand the underlying the components of credibility. By averaging across items, researchers
are essentially creating a scale of credibility. Research is first needed to establish the reliability
and validity of scales before they are used to interpret results. If adult witness credibility is
similar to other areas of credibility and is comprised of separate factors, it may be that witness
characteristics affect factors differently. Without the proper analyses, the true effects of witness
characteristics on credibility may be lost.
In fact, there is evidence that witness characteristics may affect credibility items
differently. As previously mentioned, inconsistencies in testimony and their effect on credibility
ratings have been one focus of adult credibility research. Often when witnesses are inconsistent,
lawyers try to use this to discredit them during cross-examination. Some studies have shown that
these inconsistencies negatively affect credibility scores (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman et al.,
1995). Other studies have found no effect of inconsistency, but rather other variables such as
having low confidence (Brewer & Burke, 2002) or being poorly-calibrated (e.g., exhibiting high
confidence and having an error in testimony; Tenney et al., 2007) significantly decrease
credibility ratings.
It is unclear how inconsistencies would affect credibility ratings if it were split into
cognitive accuracy and honesty factors. Evidence that there may be a differential impact on
cognitive accuracy and honesty items comes from Berman and colleagues (1995). They found
that overall, inconsistencies during testimony decrease credibility ratings. The authors measured
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variables in addition to credibility such as accuracy and trustworthiness, but analyses were not
done on separate items to determine whether or not ratings on items related to cognitive accuracy
differed from ratings on items such as honesty or likability. When examining means for
individual items, it appears as though inconsistencies in testimony affected the cognitive
component of accuracy but had only a small effect on honesty and likability ratings. When a
witness was consistent versus inconsistent, mean accuracy ratings dropped from M = 3.08 to
M = 0.88 (on a seven-point scale), respectively; mean honesty ratings only dropped from M =
3.44 to M = 2.48, a much less striking decrease. This finding confirms the common belief held
by jurors that inconsistent witnesses are less accurate (Brewer et al., 1999; Fisher & Cutler,
1995); however, it raises a question of whether or not credibility should be evaluated by
averaging across both cognitive items and honesty items. As an illustration, if accuracy and
honesty ratings were averaged, there would be a decrease in ratings from M = 3.26 to M = 1.68,
when witnesses were consistent versus inconsistent. While this is a distinct decrease, it is skewed
by the very low accuracy ratings for inconsistent witnesses. By averaging across items that are
affected differently, potentially important effects may be lost.
In another example, ratings of the possible cognitive item of confidence decreased from
M = 4.04 to M = 2.52 when a witness was consistent versus inconsistent, whereas likeability
ratings only decreased from M = 4.12 to M = 3.24 (Berman et al., 1995). It may be that
inconsistencies only affect cognitive components being measured and have a markedly smaller
effect on honesty components. If these two components are affected differently by
inconsistencies in testimony, perhaps they should be analyzed as two separate components of
credibility. It remains an empirical question as to how inconsistencies would influence overall
verdict decisions if they only affect one aspect of credibility.
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In examining other studies in this area, it was not possible to determine whether cognitive
components behaved differently than honesty components because means of items were not
reported within the article (Tenney et al., 2007) or the effects being manipulated were not
specific to cognitive accuracy or honesty components (e.g., effects of accent, ethnicity, age, or
gender; Frumkin, 2007; Lindholm, 2008; Mueller-Johnson et al., 2007; Newcombe &
Bransgrove, 2007).
In summary, because data suggest that inconsistencies appear to affect cognitive
components and honesty components of credibility differentially (Berman et al., 1995), it may
follow that expressions of cognitive weakness, such as a witness’s poor memory, will only affect
items that are related to cognitive abilities. It may also be that expressions of honesty, such as a
witness’s trustworthiness, may be shown to only affect items that are related to honesty
characteristics. The current study will manipulate both perceived cognitive accuracy and
perceived honesty components in order to test this hypothesis. Further, if components are
affected differentially, this may suggest that adult witness credibility is comprised of at least two
factors, a finding that has been supported in other areas of psychological research (Berlo et al.,
1969; Brodsky et al., 2010; Hovland et al., 1953; McCroskey, 1966; McCroskey & Jenson, 1975;
Ross et al., 2003; Singletary, 1976; Whitehead, 1968).

Multiple Factor Models of Witness Credibility
Support for an adult witness credibility model that contains more than one factor comes
from several areas of psychological research. First, Hovland and colleagues (1953) developed
one of the earliest models of source credibility based on evaluation and experimental studies.
They identified two main components of credibility: expertise and trustworthiness. Following
this, other researchers began to examine these components as well as additional underlying
9

components of source credibility through factor analyses. Several studies identified similar
underlying components of credibility to those identified by Hovland et al. (1953). McCroskey
and colleagues (1966; McCroskey & Jenson, 1975) conducted a series of experiments and factor
analyses examining credibility across sources, including mass media and individual speakers
with varying characteristics. They measured credibility using Likert-items as well as semantic
differential-type scales (e.g., expert-inexpert, intellectual-narrow). They found two main
components of credibility that they labeled authoritativeness and character. While these labels do
not match those given by Hovland and colleagues (1953), the underlying components do appear
to be similar. McCroskey and colleague’s (1966; 1975) authoritativeness factor, with items such
as reliable, informed, and intelligent, could also be described as expertise. In addition, their
character factor, with items such as honest, pleasant, and virtuous could also be described as
trustworthiness.
In contrast to a simple two-factor model, Whitehead (1968) conducted a factor analysis
on 65 scale items of source credibility. He manipulated speakers’ credibility by varying level of
education achieved, accolades received, and biases present. Whitehead (1968) identified four
underlying factors of credibility: trustworthiness (e.g., honest, sincere, moral), dynamism (e.g.,
energetic, aggressive, bold), professionalism (e.g., professional, experienced, authoritative), and
objectivity (open-minded, objective, impartial). The trustworthiness factor is most similar to the
component with the same name identified by Hovland et al. (1953) and the character factor
identified by McCroskey and colleagues (1966; 1975). While the professionalism factor shares
some similarity with an expertise component, dynamism and objectivity were not included in
Hovland and colleagues’ (1953) dimensions of credibility. Other studies on source credibility
have included models for three-, or six-factors; however, trustworthiness and expertise are main
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components of their models as well (Berlo et al., 1969; Singletary 1976). It appears as if across a
variety of mass media and other communication sources, trustworthiness and expertise are
consistently found to be underlying components of credibility.
Second, in the legal psychology field, a multiple factor model of credibility has been
tested using child witnesses (Ross et al., 2003), expert witnesses (Brodsky et al., 2010), and
older, female witnesses (Kwong See, Hoffman, & Wood, 2001). Research focusing on child
witnesses has often categorized credibility into two separate, independent constructs (Bottoms,
1993; Connolly, Price, & Gordon, 2010; Ross et al., 2003). Ross and colleagues (2003) tested
this hypothesis. The authors had participants view a video of a trial in which a child
victim/witness testified about an incident of sexual abuse that she experienced. Participants then
rated the child witness on 14 items of credibility. Nine items were used to assess perceived
cognitive ability and five were used to assess perceived honesty of the child witness. Items
measuring cognitive ability included general and specific memory, intelligent, and consistency of
testimony. Items measuring honesty included believability, truthfulness of testimony, fabrication
of story, and suggestibility. In two studies conducting factor analyses, they showed that
credibility could be separated into two, relatively independent factors: cognitive ability and
honesty. In addition, they showed that honesty was a significantly better predictor of verdict.
Their results are similar to those credibility components first reported by Hovland et al. (1953) as
well as additional source credibility research (Berlo et al., 1969; McCroskey, 1966; McCroskey
& Jenson, 1975; Singletary, 1976; Whitehead, 1968).
In addition to the child witness area of legal psychology, a multiple factor model
consisting of four factors has also been proposed for expert witness testimony. Brodsky et al.
(2010) had participants watch a video of expert witness testimony. Participants then rated expert
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witnesses on 41 items of credibility using semantic differential-type scales. After a factor
analysis, the authors identified four factors of credibility, each consisting of five items:
knowledgeable, likeability, trustworthiness, and confidence. While some factors may also be
relevant for eyewitnesses, others may only apply to expert witnesses. It appears as though the
factors of knowledgeable and confidence relate most to the expertise or cognitive ability factor
identified by previous research (Hovland et al., 1953; Ross et al., 2003); items included
informed, wise, self-assured, and confident. The item of informed, for example, asked
participants to rate how informed the expert witnessed appeared to be on a scale of 1 (uniformed)
to 10 (informed). Other items of the knowledgeable factor, including scientific, logical, and
educated, may be specific to expert witnesses only. Expert witnesses are usually testifying
because they have specialized, scientific knowledge in a certain field, whereas eyewitnesses are
simply testifying because they witnessed a crime and are assumed to have no specialized,
scientific skills. Therefore, items such as memory and accuracy may be more useful in measuring
the cognitive component of credibility for eyewitnesses. It also appears as though the factor of
trustworthiness corresponds most to the honesty/trustworthiness factor identified by previous
research (Hovland et al., 1953; Ross et al., 2003); items included honesty, dependability, and
reliability. The factor of likeability, with items such as well-mannered, pleasant, and kind, may
only be applicable when participants are able view witnesses in person or by videotape and is not
able to be measured through a trial transcript. In taking a closer look at the factors of credibility
for expert witnesses, it seems as though the factor of trustworthiness and a combination of items
within the knowledgeable and confidence factors would be most relevant to the measurement of
adult eyewitness credibility.
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Kwong See and colleagues (2001) also identified two factors of credibility for older,
female witnesses. The authors were mainly interested in discovering if an age-related stereotype
existed when participants were asked to evaluate the credibility of an older, female witness. A
factor analysis was conducted to validate scales the authors used for measuring credibility, but
was not the main focus of the study. Nonetheless, two factors of credibility were identified. It
seems as if the first factor, labeled memory/competency, relates best to the cognitive ability
factor found with child witnesses (Ross et al., 2003), with items of competency, accuracy, good
memory, and reliability. It also seems as if the second factor, labeled honesty, corresponds to the
factor of the same name with child witnesses (Ross et al., 2003), with items of honesty, sincerity,
and trustworthiness.
There also exists evidence of a possible two-factor model of credibility in studies using
adult witnesses. While not specifically assessing a multiple-factor model of witness credibility,
Ruva and Bryant (2004) identified multiple factors from a 24-item credibility scale that included
items such as confidence, accuracy, and honesty. The researchers investigated the effects of age,
speech style, and question form on credibility and carried out a factor analysis on the 24
credibility items. Four factors were identified: witness credibility (including both cognitive
accuracy and honesty items), prosecution misleading, prosecutor opinion, and defense
misleading. While cognitive accuracy and honesty items were combined into one factor, there
may be some problems with this grouping. Of the 24-items used to assess credibility, only two
items assessed honesty. Further, when comparing loadings of items onto the witness credibility
factor, honesty had a loading of only 0.45, while cognitive accuracy factors of accuracy and
consistency had loadings of 0.74 and 0.79, respectively. This suggests that the component of

13

honesty could be measured with multiple items and should be re-assessed to see whether it forms
a separate factor.
Finally, there also exists anecdotal evidence that credibility contains several components
amongst professionals in the legal field. For example, lawyers and judges often refer to witness
credibility as being influenced by cognitive factors that relate to witness’s testimony, such as
inconsistencies, as well as other factors related to the honesty of witnesses themselves, such as
having prior criminal records or motivation to fabricate details of a crime (Kane, 2007). Further,
lawyers are advised to attack a witness’s credibility on several angles that relate to the two
components of credibility identified by previous research (Hovland et al., 1953; Kwong See et
al., 2001; Ross et al., 2003). For example, they are advised that pointing out inconsistent
statements, as well as introducing any information that may damage the witness’s character will
reduce credibility (McElhaney, 1992; McElhaney, 2002). Judges also instruct jurors to
incorporate information such as the ability to recall accurate details, motives, and gestures or
expressions from witnesses into their credibility decisions and judgments (Kane, 2007; “Criminal
Jury Instructions,” n.d.). Based on this information, it appears as though lawyers believe that
multiple components affect adult witness credibility, but the majority of current research in the
field has not yet studied credibility in this manner.
The current line of research was also driven by a recently completed study by the current
author. Moore and Scullin (2010) examined credibility ratings as a function of crime severity
(i.e., violent or nonviolent), confidence, and inconsistencies in testimony. Credibility scores were
created by averaging across ratings of believability, honesty, and trustworthiness. Upon further
examination of the credibility items, it may have been problematic to simply average these three
items together into one credibility rating. When analyses were replicated using each individual
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item as opposed to the average of the items, different findings emerged depending on which item
was used in the analysis. In both the nonviolent and violent conditions, analyses on the
individual items of trustworthiness and believability did not match the results when the three
items were averaged together. Previous research (Ross et al., 2003) suggests believability,
honesty, and trustworthiness may all be related to the honesty factor of witness credibility.
Therefore, all three items should follow the same pattern of results. Perhaps the inclusion of
multiple manipulations (i.e., crime severity, confidence, and inconsistencies) in Moore and
Scullin (2010) also had an effect on the data or perhaps believability and trustworthiness items
should not be included in the honesty component for adult witnesses. The current study will
examine whether believability and trustworthiness are all related to the honesty factor of witness
credibility. Further, ratings of cognitive accuracy such as memory and confidence were not
included in Moore and Scullin’s (2010) credibility measure and it is unknown how these items
may correspond or differ from items measuring witness honesty. The current study will use these
same items, as well as additional items relating to cognitive accuracy and honesty, to identify the
underlying components of adult witness credibility.

Current Study
Because results from previous research suggest that witness factors (such as
inconsistencies in testimony) differentially affect credibility items relating to cognitive accuracy
and honesty, and multiple factor models of credibility have been found in other areas of
psychology, a two-factor model of credibility may extend to adult witnesses as well. The current
study attempted to identify whether cognitive accuracy and honesty form two separate
components of witness credibility. Four main hypotheses were tested: 1) witness credibility
would be able to be separated into at least two factors: perceived cognitive accuracy and
15

perceived honesty; 2) an inconsistent witness would be rated significantly lower on scales
relating to cognitive accuracy, but not on scales relating to honesty; 3) a witness with a prior
criminal record would be rated significantly lower on scales relating to honesty, but not on scales
relating to cognitive accuracy; and 4) both the cognitive accuracy and honesty components
would significantly predict overall verdict decisions and would have an effect on likelihood of
commission scores.
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Method
Participants were 437 students enrolled in Introductory to Psychology courses at the
University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) that received course credit for their participation. Fiftyfour participants were dropped due to various reasons. Participants completed the study online by
reading a trial transcript and completed several questionnaires (described in detail below).
Because it was an online survey, there was a concern that some participants may not have
devoted enough time to fully read the transcript and only quickly answered the required
questions to receive credit. Therefore, completion times were examined for each participant and
those that took less than 13 minutes were excluded from analyses (n = 32). The remaining
participants took between 14 and 66 minutes (M = 30.19, SD = 10.38). Participants were also
asked to render a verdict after reading the trial transcript. Because verdicts were central to the
study and later analyses, seven participants were excluded because they failed to render a verdict.
Three participants were excluded because they failed to complete 33% or more of the postverdict questionnaire. Finally, all participants were required to answer the following two
questions about the transcript correctly: What was one of the items reported stolen? and With
what crime is the defendant being charged? Twelve participants were excluded because they
answered at least one question incorrectly. A total of 383 participants were included in the
analyses. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 40 (M = 20.10, SD = 4.00) and most were female
(61.4%) and Hispanic (82.0%).

Design and Materials
A 3 (Perceived Cognitive Accuracy [neutral, medium, low]) x 3 (Perceived Honesty
[neutral, medium, low]) between-subjects design was used to assess differences in credibility
ratings, verdicts, and likelihood of commission scores.
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A voir dire form provided demographic information on each participant and their past
involvement in the criminal justice system (see Appendix B). It also assessed how often
participants read and watched media pertaining to the legal system.
Nine versions of a trial transcript were created based on the transcript used in Tenney et
al. (2007; see Appendix C). A previous pilot study was conducted on a control version of the
trial transcript with 47 UTEP students and achieved an approximate 50/50 verdict split with
59.6% guilty verdicts and 40.4% not guilty verdicts. In all transcripts the defendant was on trial
for burglary of a habitation and there was one witness who reported seeing the defendant leave
the crime scene. Witnesses were depicted as neutral, medium or low in cognitive accuracy and
neutral, medium, or low in honesty. All trial transcripts contained a brief description of the
crime, introducing the victim, eyewitness, and suspect. The nine transcripts contained the same
instructions to participants as well as a statement from the judge describing the basis for a guilty
or not guilty conviction. In addition, Karen Doty, J.D. edited the transcripts and made
suggestions and comments in order to ensure that they were ecologically valid and as faithful as
possible to courtroom procedure.
Because previous research suggests that inconsistencies in witness testimony may cause
scores on cognitive accuracy items to decrease (Berman et al., 1995), the current study used
errors to manipulate cognitive accuracy. To demonstrate neutral, medium, or low perceived
cognitive accuracy, the witness made no errors, one error, or three errors during testimony. Prior
to the current study, a pilot study was conducted to ensure that errors made during testimony
resulted in lower ratings on select cognitive accuracy items. The pilot study included 16 UTEP
students that read a short summary describing a defendant on trial for burglary of a habitation.
The witness to the crime gave a description of the suspect during the trial that was inconsistent
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with his statement prior to the trial. Participants rated the perceived memory, intelligence,
honesty, and trustworthiness of the witness on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10 (completely). Mean
scores of honesty, trustworthiness, and intelligence were all equal to or greater than 4.50. The
mean score of memory was 2.87. Because inconsistencies did result in lower memory scores,
this manipulation was used for the current study.
In the neutral cognitive accuracy condition, the witness stated the man he saw had blonde
hair in his original statement to the police and during testimony, demonstrating no
inconsistencies. In the medium cognitive accuracy condition, the witness testified that he saw a
man with blonde hair leaving the victim’s dorm room. However, during cross examination the
defense attorney pointed out that in the witness’s original written statement to police he claimed
the man had black hair. The attorney asked the witness: “So you only changed your story to say
the man was blonde after you found out that my client has blonde hair, correct?” In the low
cognitive accuracy condition, the witness made the same error described above in the medium
condition, and made two additional errors about the height of the suspect and clothes the suspect
was wearing.
In order to demonstrate medium and low honesty, the witness’s past criminal record was
stated during testimony. This manipulation was chosen because past research has shown that
negative character evidence has a larger effect than positive character evidence (Lupfer, Cohen,
Bernard, & Smalley, 1986; Tanford & Cox, 1988). Further, when jurors are given information
about specific negative acts of a defendant, he was judged as significantly less trustworthy than
when there was no character evidence given (Hunt & Budesheim, 2004).
Prior to the current study, pilot studies were conducted to identify crimes that may result
in lower perceived honesty scores. Participants were 84 UTEP students that read a brief trial
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summary describing defendants that were charged with one of the following crimes: perjury,
fraud, theft, burglary, or identity theft. They then rated defendants on perceived cognitive
functioning, intelligence, honesty, and trustworthiness on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10
(completely). In order to be included in the current study, crimes that resulted in lower honesty
and trustworthiness ratings were necessary. The crime of fraud resulted in means greater than
6.00 for all items, and therefore did not show lower honesty or trustworthiness scores. The crime
of identity theft also resulted in means greater than 4.00 for all items. The crimes of burglary,
theft, and perjury resulted in honesty and trustworthiness means less than 3.50 and were
therefore included in the current study.
In the medium honesty condition, the defense attorney asked the witness during cross
examination if it was true that he has a past criminal history of one count of perjury. The witness
confirmed his past criminal act and acknowledged that he received a fine and jail time. In the low
honesty condition, the defense attorney stated the same charge of perjury described above in the
medium honesty condition and also mentioned two additional criminal charges of theft and
burglary on the witness’s record. In the neutral honesty condition, the witness’s past criminal
record was not brought up during testimony; no information on witness honesty was given.
A verdict form (see Appendix D) was used to assess guilty and not guilty verdicts, as
well as participants’ confidence in their verdicts on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (completely).
If guilty, a measure of sentence length in years and an optional fine were also obtained.
The post verdict questionnaire contained 30 questions and was used to measure witness
credibility and likelihood of commission scores (see Appendix E). The 29 items used to measure
witness credibility were: general memory, specific memory, memory for the suspect’s
appearance, consistency of testimony, intelligent, accuracy, accuracy of suspect description,
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confidence, competence, reliable, appearance of confusion, bias, cognitive functioning, ability to
remember and answer questions, self-assured, well-spoken, poised, believability of testimony,
honest, trustworthy, fabrication of story, moral, ethical, sincere, likable, suggestible, honorable,
genuine, and testimony influence on jurors’ opinions. For example the general memory question
asked participants, “How accurate was the witness, Victor Guzman, in his account of the events
of the crime?” Each item was rated on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely). Some items used
to measure credibility were developed based on previous research that found them to be related
to one of the two predicted factors (Ross et al., 2003). For all but four of the items, higher scores
reflected more positive ratings; the items of bias, suggestible, fabrication of story, and
appearance of confusion were reverse-coded before being subjected to analysis in order to follow
the same pattern of higher scores indicating more positive ratings.
Finally, a likelihood of commission score was obtained. Participants rated the likelihood
that they thought the defendant committed the crime on a scale of 0 to 100%.

Procedure
All data were collected online. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of nine
trial transcripts. They were instructed to take on the role of a juror in a criminal trial and were
told that they would be reading a trial transcript and answering questions based upon it.
Participants read and completed the following items in the order listed: the voir dire form, trial
transcript, verdict form, and a post verdict questionnaire. Sona Systems, Ltd was used for all data
collection. Participants also had the option to refuse to answer any questions. When participants
completed all materials, they were thanked for their participation and awarded course credit.
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Results
For a confirmatory factor analysis, a sample size of 383 was adequate; a power analysis
was conducted (Preacher & Coffman, 2006) and a sample size of 351 was needed in order to
achieve power of 80% (df = 376; reject a null hypothesis of an RMSEA of .10). In addition,
assuming communalities of approximately 0.5 (based on communalities found in Ross et al.,
2003), MacCallum and colleagues (1999) recommend a sample size between 100 and 200.

Missing Data
There were 57 (14.84%) cases of incomplete data for the 29 credibility scale items. Data
were subjected to multiple imputation using SPSS software and a chained equation algorithm
method. In order to maximize power, 20 imputations were created using a maximum of 200
iterations as suggested by Enders (2010). All further analyses were conducted using pooled
estimates from the 20 imputed data sets.
Pooled parameter estimates were created by averaging across parameters from the 20
imputed data sets. Pooled standard errors were created by calculating a between-imputation
variance (BIV), which takes into account sampling error due to missing data, and a withinimputation variance (WIV), which is the sampling error from the completed data (Enders, 2010).
Between- and within-imputation variances were calculated using the formulas below:
BIV

=

WIV =

∑ (βt - β)2
m-1
∑ SEt2
m

1

Estimated sample size is calculated using degrees of freedom. Because the degrees of freedom were fairly high in
the current study (df = 376), the estimated sample size is skewed.
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A pooled standard error was then calculated using the formula below:
SE(β) = √ WIV + BIV + (BIV/m)
Average parameter estimates were divided by pooled standard errors in order to create a
test statistic. Test statistics were then compared to the appropriate thresholds in order to ascertain
statistical significance (p ≤ .05).
Factor Analysis
The first hypothesis predicted that credibility would be composed of two separate
components of cognitive accuracy and honesty. The 29 items that made up the credibility
questionnaire were analyzed using a confirmatory factor analysis. It was expected that the
following 17 items would load onto the perceived cognitive accuracy factor: general memory,
memory for the event, memory for the suspect’s appearance, consistency of testimony,
intelligent, accuracy, accuracy of suspect description, confidence, competence, reliable,
appearance of confusion, bias, cognitive functioning, self-assured, well-spoken, poised, and
ability to remember and answer questions. It was also expected that the following 12 items
would load onto the perceived honesty factor: believability of testimony, honest, trustworthy,
fabrication of story, moral, ethical, sincere, likable, suggestible, honorable, genuine, and
testimony influence on jurors’ opinions. Finally, it was expected that the cognitive accuracy and
honesty factors would be positively correlated.
The model was over-identified with a total of 59 parameters estimated. Because loadings
of items were a central part of the analysis, all loadings were included as parameter estimates and
variances of each hypothesized factor were set to one. No error terms in the model were
correlated.

23

The 29 items that made up the credibility questionnaire were assessed for multivariate
violations of normality. For all items, skewness and kurtosis were violated, χ2 > 18.394, p = .000;
therefore, the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimation with the Satora-Bentler χ2 was used for
analyses.
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using LISREL Software (version 8.8).
After conducting 20 imputations and pooling analyses, results showed all items loaded
significantly onto their hypothesized factors except for one. The bias item failed to load onto the
perceived cognitive accuracy scale with a pooled standard loading of 0.00. See Table 1 on the
next page for the unstandardized and standardized pooled factor loadings.
Model fit was examined using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria of reporting multiple
indices with good fit indicated by a non-significant chi-square value, CFI ≥ 0.95, SRMR ≤ 0.08,
and RMSEA ≤ 0.06. The current model had adequate fit with χSB2 ranging from 1813.83 to
1889.64, p < .01, CFI ranging from 0.972 to 0.974, SRMR ranging from 0.0591 to 0.0603, and
RMSEA ranging from .101 to .103.

24

Table 1: Two-Factor Model – Pooled Loadings
Standardized
Unstandardized
Loadings
Loadings (SE)
Factor 1:
Perceived Cognitive Accuracy
General Accuracy
.91
2.37 (0.08)
Ability to Remember
.90
2.42 (0.08)
and Answer Questions
General Memory
.89
2.20 (0.08)
Memory for
.88
2.39 (0.08)
Appearance
Memory for Crime
.88
2.35 (0.08)
Consistent
.85
2.46 (0.08)
Reliable
.85
2.14 (0.08)
Well-Spoken
.84
2.07 (0.08)
Cognitive Functioning
.84
1.94 (0.08)
Confident
.83
2.37 (0.09)
Self-Assured
.80
2.06 (0.09)
Intelligent
.78
1.67 (0.08)
Accuracy of
.77
1.81 (0.08)
Description
Competent
.73
1.50 (0.09)
Poised
.64
1.39 (0.11)
Confused
.55
1.58 (0.14)
Bias
.00
0.00 (0.14)
Factor 2:
Perceived Honesty
Trustworthy
.90
2.22 (0.08)
Genuine
.90
2.13 (0.07)
Honor
.88
2.15 (0.08)
Sincere
.87
2.16 (0.08)
Honest
.87
2.08 (0.08)
Likeable
.86
2.07 (0.08)
Ethical
.86
2.01 (0.08)
Believable
.85
2.15 (0.08)
Moral
.83
1.93 (0.08)
Suggestible
-.65
-1.45 (0.10)
Falsification
.48
1.22 (0.12)
Influence
.26
0.67 (0.14)
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Because one item did not load significantly onto its hypothesized factor and several items
were found to be problematic, a revised confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. The bias
item was excluded from the revised model because it did not load significantly onto the
perceived cognitive accuracy factor. A test was done to ascertain whether the bias item loaded,
instead, onto the perceived honesty factor; results were non-significant and showed very low
unstandardized (0.14) and standardized loadings (0.06).
In addition, the suggestible item was excluded because it was reverse-coded and loaded
negatively onto the perceived honesty factor, indicating that more suggestible witnesses had
higher honesty. Participants may have had difficulty understanding the definition of
suggestibility, therefore it was excluded. The items of reliable and competence were excluded
because it was reasoned that one could be reliable and competent in terms of both memory (i.e.,
cognitive accuracy) and honesty. Modification indices were also quite high (greater than 34 and
53, respectively) for both of these items, indicating they may load significantly onto the honesty
factor as well as the cognitive accuracy factor. The items of poised, appearance of confusion,
falsification, and testimony influence on jurors’ opinions were excluded because they did not
load as high on their hypothesized factors as other items in the model. Finally, the items of
memory for the event, memory for the suspect’s appearance, and accuracy of suspect description
were excluded. Already included in the revised model were two items to described overall
memory and accuracy, labeled general memory and general accuracy. Because the ‘general’
items loaded significantly onto the cognitive accuracy factor, specific items describing the
memory and accuracy for the crime were excluded from the revised model to reduce redundancy.
The remaining items had pooled standardized loadings of 0.78 or higher on their hypothesized
factors in the original model.
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The revised model hypothesized that the following nine items would load significantly
onto the perceived cognitive accuracy factor: general memory, consistency of testimony,
intelligent, accuracy, confidence, cognitive functioning, self-assured, well-spoken, and ability to
remember and answer questions. It was also expected that the following nine items would load
significantly onto the perceived honesty factor: believability of testimony, honest, trustworthy,
moral, ethical, sincere, likable, honorable, and genuine. See Table 2 on the next page for items,
their related questions on the post-verdict questionnaire, and their hypothesized factor. The
cognitive accuracy and honesty factors were expected to be positively correlated.
The revised model was also over-identified with a total of 37 parameters estimated.
Again, all loadings were included as parameter estimates and variances of each factor were set to
one. No error terms in the model were correlated.
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Table 2: Cognitive Accuracy and Honesty Scale Items
Item
Corresponding Question
Cognitive Accuracy
Factor
General Memory In general, how good is Victor Guzman’s memory?
Consistency How consistent was Victor Guzman’s testimony? That is, did he
always tell the same story while testifying?
Intelligent In your opinion, how intelligent is the witness, Victor Guzman?
Accuracy In general, did you find Victor Guzman to be accurate?
Confidence In your opinion, how confident was Victor Guzman?
Cognitive Does Victor Guzman have a high cognitive functioning ability?
Functioning
Self-Assured Did you find Victor Guzman to be self-assured during the trial?
Well-Spoken Did you find Victor Guzman to be well-spoken during the trial?
Ability to Remember In general, how well did the witness, Victor Guzman, appear to
and Answer be able to think, remember, and answer the questions the lawyer
Questions asked?
Honesty
Factor
Believability How believable did you find Victor Guzman’s testimony to be in
this trial?
Honest In your opinion, how honest is Victor Guzman?
Trustworthy How trustworthy did you find the witness, Victor Guzman to be
in this trial?
Moral In general, does the witness, Victor Guzman have a strong sense
of morality?
Ethical In your opinion, how ethical is the witness, Victor Guzman?
Sincere How sincere did you find Victor Guzman to be in this trial?
Likable How likeable did you find the witness, Victor Guzman to be in
this trial?
Honorable In your opinion, is Victor Guzman honorable?
Genuine How genuine did you find Victor Guzman to be in this trial?

28

As described previously, analyses were conducted on the multiple imputed data sets and
results were pooled. Results showed that all 18 items loaded significantly onto their hypothesized
factors. See Table 3 below for the pooled standardized and unstandardized loadings. Model fit on
the revised model was also examined using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria of reporting multiple
indices. The current model had adequate fit with χSB2 ranging from 751.28 to 776.53, p < .01,
CFI of .978, SRMR ranging from .0513 to .0523, and RMSEA ranging from .111 to .112. See
Appendix A for tables depicting the covariances between items and means/standard deviations of
each item.
Table 3: Revised Two-Factor Model – Pooled Loadings
Standardized
Unstandardized
Loadings
Loadings (SE)
Factor 1:
Perceived Cognitive Accuracy
General Accuracy
.90
2.35 (0.08)
Ability to Remember
.89
2.38 (0.08)
and Answer Questions
General Memory
.87
2.17 (0.08)
Confident
.85
2.41 (0.08)
Well-Spoken
.85
2.10 (0.08)
Cognitive Functioning
.85
1.96 (0.08)
Consistent
.84
2.43 (0.09)
Self-Assured
.82
2.10 (0.09)
Intelligent
.79
1.71 (0.08)
Factor 2:
Perceived Honesty
Trustworthy
.90
2.22 (0.08)
Genuine
.90
2.13 (0.07)
Honor
.88
2.15 (0.08)
Sincere
.87
2.17 (0.08)
Honest
.87
2.08 (0.08)
Likeable
.86
2.07 (0.08)
Ethical
.86
2.01 (0.08)
Believable
.85
2.15 (0.08)
Moral
.84
1.93 (0.08)
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Squared multiple correlations for the items can be used as an effect size indicator. The
cognitive accuracy factor is accounting for a large amount of variance in the nine items that load
onto it, with squared multiple correlations ranging from .631 to .816. Similarly, the honesty
factor is accounting for a large amount of variance in the nine items that load onto it, with
squared multiple correlations ranging from .680 to .810.
Based on previous research (Kwong See et al., 2001; Ross et al., 2003), the cognitive
accuracy and honesty factors were predicted to be positively correlated. Results showed the two
factors to be highly positively correlated, r = .89.
Because the two factors were so highly correlated, a one-factor model was also tested. All
18 items included in the revised model were modeled to load onto a single factor of credibility.
Model fit was assessed using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria of reporting multiple indices. The
one-factor model had adequate fit with χSB2 ranging from 1471.48 to 1517.01, p < .01, CFI
ranging from .952 to .953, SRMR ranging from .0583 to .0585, and RMSEA ranging from .162
to .164. However, because all model fit indices showed better fit and previous research shows
more support for a multiple factor model of credibility (Brodsky et al., 2010; Hovland et al.,
1953; McCroskey, 1966; McCroskey & Jenson, 1975; Ross et al., 2003; Whitehead, 1968), a
two-factor model was accepted for the current study.

Perceived Cognitive Accuracy and Perceived Honesty Scales
Cognitive accuracy and honesty scales were then created based on the revised model
discussed above. See Table 2 on page 29 for a description of the items on each scale. Measures
of reliability for the perceived cognitive accuracy and honesty scales were calculated on each of
the 20 imputed data sets. Cronbach’s alpha for the cognitive accuracy scale ranged from .958 to
.959. For the honesty scale, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .965 to .966. As an additional
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measure of reliability, McDonald’s Omega (McDonald, 1999) was calculated on each of the
imputed data sets. For the cognitive accuracy scale, McDonald’s Omega was .96. For the honesty
scale, McDonald’s Omega was .97. Both measures indicate the scales are highly reliable.
Inter-correlations were calculated between the items on each scale. See Table 4 on the
next page for the pooled correlations among items. See Appendix A, Table 8 for intercorrelations of items between scales. For the cognitive accuracy scale items, correlations ranged
from .586 to .844 and all were significant at p < .01. For the honesty scale items, correlations
ranged from .654 to .830 and all were also significant at p < .01.
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Table 4: Inter-correlations of Scale Items
Factor 1:
Cognitive Accuracy
General
Accuracy

Ability to
Remember
and Answer
Questions

General
Memory

Confident

WellSpoken

Cognitive
Functioning

Consistent

SelfAssured

Intelligent

General
Accuracy

1

Ability to
Remember and
Answer
Questions

.803

1

General
Memory

.827

.766

1

Confident

.749

.750

.730

1

Well-Spoken

.749

.765

.713

.724

1

Cognitive
Functioning

.767

.754

.729

.690

.770

1

Consistent

.721

.844

.727

.725

.687

.682

1

Self-Assured

.720

.753

.682

.805

.751

.700

.712

1

Intelligent

.690

.617

.758

.672

.685

.705

.619

.586

1

Genuine

Honor

Sincere

Honest

Likeable

Ethical

Believable

Moral

Factor 2:
Honesty

Trustworthy

Trustworthy
1

Genuine

.786

1

Honor

.750

.830

1

Sincere

.734

.802

.802

1

Honest

.809

.756

.791

.757

1

Likeable

.793

.792

.721

.743

.733

1

Ethical

.769

.778

.760

.776

.735

.730

1

Believable

.828

.724

.691

.724

.798

.750

.698

1

Moral

.694

.771

.805

.802

.748

.671

.759

.654

Note: All correlations are significant at p < .01.
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1

The second and third hypotheses predicted that an inconsistent witness would only show
deficits on the cognitive accuracy scale and a witness with a prior criminal record would only
show deficits on the honesty scale. LISREL software was used to construct a Multiple Indicators
Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model to test for latent mean differences in perceived cognitive
accuracy and perceived honesty scales by neutral, medium, and low cognitive accuracy and
honesty manipulations2. The MIMIC model allows for analysis of a single covariance matrix
whereby latent factors are regressed on dummy coded variables. Direct effects of dummy coded
variables on latent variables can be measured, allowing one to examine group differences on the
latent variable mean. This is a more powerful test than simply comparing group means with an
analysis of variance. By testing for latent mean differences rather than observed mean
differences (ANOVA test), error is removed from the measures and one is able to examine true
group differences (Aiken, Stein, & Bentler, 1994).
For the current study, the three levels of each independent variable were dummy coded
with the medium condition acting as the referent condition. It was expected that cognitive
accuracy manipulations would only affect the cognitive accuracy factor and that honesty
manipulations would only affect the honesty factor. For both manipulations, it was expected that
neutral conditions would have higher scores than medium conditions and that medium conditions
would have higher scores than low conditions. Again, all analyses reflect pooled results from the
20 multiple imputations.

2

Two 3 x 3 (Perceived Cognitive Accuracy x Perceived Honesty) analyses of variances were also conducted to test
this hypothesis. Results mirrored those found with the MIMIC model.
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For the cognitive accuracy conditions, results were in the expected direction, however,
both the cognitive accuracy and honesty scales showed latent mean differences (see Table 5 on
next page). As expected, results showed that latent mean cognitive accuracy scale scores
(measured on a scale of 1 to 7) incrementally increased as the conditions moved from low, to
medium, to neutral.
Latent mean cognitive accuracy scale scores were 1.36 greater in the neutral cognitive
accuracy condition, holding all else constant, than in the medium cognitive accuracy condition.
Latent mean cognitive accuracy scale scores were 0.41 lower in the low cognitive accuracy
condition, holding all else constant, than in the medium cognitive accuracy condition. Results
also showed that latent mean honesty scale scores (measured on a scale of 1 to 7) incrementally
increased as the conditions moved from low, to medium, to neutral. Latent mean honesty scale
scores were 0.71 greater in the neutral cognitive accuracy condition, holding all else constant,
than in the medium cognitive accuracy condition. Latent mean honesty scale scores were 0.32
lower in the low cognitive accuracy condition, holding all else constant, than in the medium
cognitive accuracy condition. LISREL provides a t-statistic to test whether the change is
significantly different from zero; all above reported increases or decreases are significantly
different from zero.
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Table 5: MIMIC Model – Pooled Loadings of Cognitive Accuracy Conditions
Standardized
Unstandardized
Loading
Loading (SE)
Cognitive Accuracy (CA)
Scale Scores
Neutral CA
0.78
1.36 (0.06)
Low CA
-0.23
-.41 (0.03)
Honesty Scale Scores
Neutral CA
0.52
0.71 (0.04)
Low CA
-.21
-0.32 (0.03)

t-test
Value

22.69
-12.86
18.94
-11.09

Note: t-tests above 2.00 are significant at p < .05

For the honesty conditions, most results were also in the expected direction, and again,
both the latent mean cognitive accuracy and honesty scale scores were affected by the honesty
manipulation (see Table 6 below). Results showed that latent mean cognitive accuracy scale
scores (measured on a scale of 1 to 7) incrementally increased only between the medium and
neutral honesty conditions. Latent mean cognitive accuracy scale scores were 0.24 greater in the
neutral honesty condition, holding all else constant, than in the medium honesty condition.
Unexpectedly, latent mean cognitive accuracy scale scores were 0.08 greater in the low honesty
condition, holding all else constant, than in the medium honesty condition. As expected, results
showed that latent mean honesty scale scores (measured on a scale of 1 to 7) incrementally
increased as the conditions moved from low, to medium, to neutral. Latent mean honesty scale
scores were 0.47 greater in the neutral honesty condition, holding all else constant, than in the
medium honesty condition. Latent mean honesty scale scores were 0.16 lower in the low honesty
condition, holding all else constant, than in the medium honesty condition. Again, all above
reported increases or decreases are significantly different from zero.
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Table 6: MIMIC Model - Pooled Loadings of Honesty Conditions
Standardized
Unstandardized
Loading
Loading (SE)
Cognitive Accuracy Scale Scores
Neutral Honesty
0.13
0.24 (0.03)
Low Honesty
0.04
0.08 (0.03)
Honesty Scale Scores
Neutral Honesty
0.32
0.47 (0.03)
Low Honesty
-0.12
-0.16 (0.03)

t-test
Value
8.75
3.05
14.91
-6.23

Note: t-tests above 2.00 are significant at p < .05

See Figures 1 (below) and 2 (on the next page) for graphs of the cognitive accuracy and
honesty scale observed means between conditions. In examining the change in observed means,
the same pattern as reported in the MIMIC model still holds true. For inconsistent witnesses,
mean cognitive accuracy scale scores continually decreased from 6.57 in the neutral condition to
3.53 in the low condition. For witnesses with a prior criminal record, mean honesty scale scores
continually decreased from 5.49 in the neutral condition to 4.36 in the low condition.

Cognitive Accuracy Scale Scores

7
6
5
4

Cognitive Accuracy
Condition

3

Honesty Condition
2
1
0
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Medium
Manipulation Level

Low

Figure 1. Mean cognitive accuracy scores by cognitive accuracy and honesty conditions.
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Mean Honesty Scale Scores
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Figure 2. Mean honesty scale scores by cognitive accuracy and honesty conditions.
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Verdicts
A binary logistic regression was used to analyze verdict decisions. The cognitive
accuracy scale, honesty scale, and interaction terms were standardized and entered as predictors
into the regression analysis. The dichotomous guilty and not guilty verdicts were the dependent
variable. It was expected that higher cognitive accuracy scale scores and higher honesty scale
scores would predict more guilty verdicts. Results supported the hypothesis, with both cognitive
accuracy and honesty scores predicting more guilty verdicts, cognitive accuracy: β = 0.56,
odds ratio = 1.75, 95% CI [1.11, 2.76], p = .016 and honesty: β = 0.89, odds ratio = 2.43,
95% CI [1.53, 3.88], p = .000, respectively. The interaction was non-significant, β = -0.01,
odds ratio = 0.99, 95% CI [0.73, 1.36], p = .957.

Likelihood of Commission Scores
As an additional measure of culpability, participants rated how likely it was they thought
the defendant committed the crime. First, likelihood of commission scores were analyzed using a
linear regression. The cognitive accuracy scale, honesty scale, and the interaction term were
entered as predictors and likelihood of commission scores acted as the dependent variable. It was
expected that higher scores on both scales would predict higher likelihood of commission scores.
Results showed that higher cognitive accuracy scale scores significantly predicted more guilty
verdicts, .288 < β > .272, t(379) = 2.29, 95% CI [0.01, 0.06], p = .022. Higher honesty scale
scores also significantly predicted more guilty verdicts, .378 < β > .361, t(379) = 3.11, 95% CI
[0.02, 0.07], p = .002. The interaction was non-significant, .023 < β > .009 , t(379) = 0.08, 95%
CI [-0.00, 0.00], p = .933.
Next, likelihood of commission scores were also analyzed using a 3 x 3 (Perceived
Cognitive Accuracy x Perceived Honesty) analysis of variance and two significant main effects
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of cognitive accuracy and honesty were predicted. Instead, results showed only a significant
main effect of cognitive accuracy, F(2, 374) = 16.26, p = .000, partial η2=.08. See Figure 3 on
below for a graph of the results. In order to test for differences between the three levels of
cognitive accuracy, a post-hoc Tukey HSD test showed the neutral condition was significantly
greater than the medium and low conditions at p = .000. The medium condition was not
significantly different than the low condition at p = .335.
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Figure 3. Mean likelihood of commission scores between Perceived Honesty and Perceived
Cognitive Accuracy (CA) conditions.

Two one-way analysis of variance tests were also conducted. See Figure 4 on the next
page for a graph of the results. The first analysis of variance showed significant differences
between the neutral cognitive accuracy condition and the medium cognitive accuracy condition,
F(1, 257) = 16.87, p = .000, partial η2=.06. Participants in the neutral cognitive accuracy
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condition thought the defendant was more culpable (M = 0.58, SD = 0.25) compared to the
medium cognitive accuracy condition (M = 0.46, SD = 0.25). The second analysis of variance
showed no significant differences between the medium cognitive accuracy condition and the low
cognitive accuracy condition, F(1, 257) = 1.97, p = .162, partial η2=.01.
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Figure 4. Mean likelihood of commission scores for the neutral, medium, and low cognitive
accuracy conditions.

Two planned comparisons were also conducted between conditions to test for significant
differences. First, a one-way analysis of variance was computed between the neutral cognitive
accuracy, neutral honesty and the medium cognitive accuracy, medium honesty condition. It was
expected that there would be significantly higher likelihood of commission scores in the neutral
cognitive accuracy, neutral honesty condition. Results supported the hypothesis, F(1, 78) = 7.49,
p = .008, partial η2=.09. Participants in the neutral cognitive accuracy, neutral honesty condition
reported higher likelihood of commission scores (M = 0.65, SD = 0.26) compared to the medium
cognitive accuracy, medium honesty condition (M = 0.48, SD = 0.27).
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A second one-way analysis of variance compared likelihood of commission scores in the
medium cognitive accuracy, medium honesty condition to the low cognitive accuracy, low
honesty condition. It was expected that there would be significantly higher likelihood of
commission scores in the medium cognitive accuracy, medium honesty condition. Results did
not show support for this hypothesis and instead indicated no significant differences between
groups, F(1, 80) = 0.47, p = .494, partial η2=.00.
Inter-correlations of Dependent Variables
Dependent variables included credibility ratings, as measured by cognitive accuracy and
honesty scale scores, verdicts, and likelihood of commission scores. All dependent variables
were correlated and were found to be highly positively correlated. See Table 7 below for
correlations.

Table 7: Inter-correlations of Dependent Variables
Cognitive
Verdict
Accuracy Scale
Verdict
1

Honesty Scale

Cognitive
Accuracy Scale

.497**

1

Honesty Scale

.520**

.852**

1

Likelihood of
Commission

.745**

.598**

.608**

Note: All correlations significant at p < .01.
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Likelihood of
Commission

1

Discussion
The current study successfully identified two factors of adult witness credibility:
perceived cognitive accuracy and perceived honesty. Based on factor analytic results, two scales
were developed to measure the factors, with nine items on each scale. Cognitive accuracy items
included: general memory, consistency of testimony, intelligent, accuracy, confident, cognitive
functioning, self-assured, well-spoken, and ability to remember and answer questions. Honesty
items included: believability of testimony, honest, trustworthy, moral, ethical, sincere, likable,
honorable, and genuine. The factors identified in the current study are similar to those found in
previous credibility studies with child witnesses (Ross et al., 2003) and other areas of social
psychology (Berlo et al., 1969; Brodsky et al., 2010; Hovland et al., 1953; McCroskey, 1966;
McCroskey & Jenson, 1975; Singletary, 1976; Whitehead, 1968).
Ross and colleagues (2003) also found that items of honest, believable, and trustworthy
indicated an honesty factor and the items general memory, ability to remember and answer
questions, consistent, and intelligent indicated a cognitive ability factor. In addition, the authors
reported highly correlated factors (r = .85) which is similar to results of the current study (r =
.89; Ross et al., 2003). Results also mirror the two factors of memory/competence and honesty
found with older, female witnesses (Kwong See et al., 2001). The current study extended this
line of research by further defining adult witness credibility and identifying additional items that
significantly loaded onto each factor.
When comparing the results of the current study to results with expert witnesses, more
differences exist. Brodsky et al. (2010) identified four factors of credibility, while the current
study only identified two. The items of self-assured, well-spoken, and confident were included in
the current study in order to parallel items loading onto the confidence factor identified by
Brodsky et al. (2010). The current study, however, found that these items loaded strongly onto
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the perceived cognitive accuracy component, eliminating the need for a stand-alone confidence
factor. The trustworthy factor (Brodsky et al., 2010) was similar to the factor of perceived
honesty in the current study. As mentioned previously, the factor of knowledgeable is more
likely to only pertain to expert witnesses rather than lay witnesses, with items such as logical and
scientific; this factor was not included in the current study. Brodsky et al. (2010) identified a
fourth factor of likable. There is limited research on likeability of eyewitnesses, but there is some
evidence that results of likability ratings follow the same pattern as honesty ratings (Tenney,
Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008) and should not be considered a separate factor. This area of
research, however, is limited by only one-item scales to measure instances of credibility and
likeability. Future research could examine eyewitness likeability and its affect on credibility
ratings. This may be done best by using video-taped mock trials rather than trial transcripts. If
likeability manipulations are found to cause changes in credibility, it would then be useful to
examine it as a factor of credibility.
The current study also provides two validated and internally consistent scales of cognitive
accuracy and honesty that can be used to measure overall witness credibility. Previous research
in this area has used a variety of scales to measure credibility, ranging from one-item scales to
multiple-item scales. This may have led to the many different results regarding the effects of
witness characteristics, such as confidence, on perceived credibility by jurors. The current study
was a first step in identifying the important components of credibility and developing scales that
can be used to measure it across a wide variety of witness characteristics.
The current study was also the first to examine how witness characteristics affect
credibility scales differentially. It was predicted that the cognitive accuracy and honesty scales
would only be influenced by inconsistencies in testimony or negative character evidence,

43

respectively. This was not the case. Instead, inconsistencies and character evidence caused
fluctuations in both cognitive accuracy and honesty scales. Because the two factors were found
to be highly correlated, this may explain why cognitive accuracy and honesty manipulations led
to changes in both scales. It is important to note, however, that inconsistencies in testimony
caused greater change in the cognitive accuracy scale and negative character evidence caused
greater change in the honesty scale. Most fluctuations were also in the expected direction, with
neutral conditions reflecting the highest cognitive accuracy and honesty scores and low
conditions reflecting the lowest scores for the two scales. There was one exception: having three
errors during testimony caused latent mean honesty scores to increase, rather than the expected
decrease. While the increase was significantly different from zero, it was minimal (.08) and may
not be meaningful.
Another important finding from the current study was that having multiple, negative
witness characteristics decreased credibility ratings more so than displaying only one negative
characteristic. Previous research has only examined the impact of witness characteristics such as
inconsistencies and negative character evidence in the singular form (Berman & Cutler, 1996;
Berman et al., 1995; Lupfer et al., 1986). For the current study, multiple inconsistencies during
testimony were found to hurt credibility judgments more so than having only one instance of an
error during testimony. In addition, having multiple past arrests led to lower honesty ratings
compared to only having one prior arrest. These findings may suggest that jurors judge
credibility incrementally; in other words, the more instances of negative characteristics, the
lower the credibility scores. A second explanation could be that jurors were simply more likely
to notice or recall three inconsistencies or prior arrests compared to only one inconsistency or
prior arrest. Because it may be easier to recall multiple instances of negative character evidence,
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credibility scores for these witnesses were lower. However, there is evidence from the current
study that most jurors did notice and recall even one instance of an inconsistency or negative
character evidence because credibility scores were lower in this condition (labeled the ‘medium’
condition in the current study) compared to conditions where no inconsistencies occurred or
negative character information was given (labeled the ‘neutral’ condition in the current study).
Based on the findings in the current study, incremental judgments of credibility hold true
especially for manipulations on each unique scale of credibility. For example, the cognitive
accuracy manipulation caused incremental decreases in the cognitive accuracy scale from
neutral, to medium, to low conditions; however, the cognitive accuracy manipulation only
caused decreases in the honesty scale from the neutral to medium conditions.
The current study also provides more evidence that there is a widespread belief among
jurors that an inconsistent witness is inaccurate (Brewer et al., 1999; Fisher & Cutler, 1995). As
witnesses increased the number of inconsistencies during testimony, jurors found them to be less
credible and found the defendant to be less culpable. Previous research suggests that it is actually
quite common for witnesses to make errors or to be inconsistent during their recount of a crime
(Brewer et al., 1999). Research has also found that inconsistencies do not correlate well with
overall witness identification accuracy (Fisher & Cutler, 1995). Therefore, it is not the best
practice for jurors to discount witnesses because they have been inconsistent. Despite this, jurors
continue to use inconsistencies against witnesses and this in turn leads to fewer guilty verdict
decisions.
It was notable that credibility ratings in both the neutral cognitive accuracy and honesty
conditions were fairly high. When no information about cognitive accuracy was given to jurors,
witnesses received an average cognitive accuracy credibility rating of 6.57 (on a scale of 1 to 7).
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When no information about honesty was given to jurors, witnesses received an average honesty
credibility rating of 5.49 (on a scale of 1 to 7). It appears as if jurors are more likely to assume
witnesses are cognitively competent and honest unless they are given evidence that suggests
otherwise. This finding is also in line with research examining character evidence. Studies have
found negative character evidence greatly impacted credibility ratings whereas positive character
evidence had no effect (Lupfer et al., 1986; Tanford & Cox, 1988). It may be that positive
character evidence has no effect because credibility is at a ceiling limit from the beginning – the
only direction to go is down. Based on previous findings and the current study, introducing
positive witness characteristics during a trial is likely to have no impact on judgments of
credibility by jurors. Instead witnesses and lawyers should focus on minimizing negative
characteristics that may be introduced during a trial.
In addition to credibility manipulations, the current study predicted that the cognitive
accuracy and honesty scales would also influence culpability measures. Culpability was
measured using dichotomous verdicts and continuous likelihood of commission scores. Both
cognitive accuracy and honesty scales affected culpability ratings. Higher cognitive accuracy and
honesty scores predicted more guilty verdicts, supporting the original hypothesis. In other words,
the more credible the witnesses, the more likely jurors were to render guilty verdicts. Finding
that both scales influenced verdicts is in contrast to previous research with child witnesses. Ross
et al. (2003) found that only honesty influenced verdicts, with higher honesty scores predicting
more guilty verdicts. It may be that jurors hold child and adult witnesses to different standards.
Children may only be expected to be honest because jurors are aware that their memory,
accuracy, and other cognitive abilities are not fully developed. Adults, on the other hand, may be
expected to be honest and have high-functioning cognitive abilities. It is important to note that in
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examining the beta weights in the current study, honesty was found to have a greater influence
on verdicts compared to cognitive accuracy. For both adults and child witnesses, honesty appears
to be the most influential factor in deciding verdicts. It appears to be important for jurors to know
that the witness does not have a history of being dishonest, possibly because it gives them more
faith that the witness’s current testimony (whether it is inconsistent or not) is the truth. Results
using the continuous culpability measure of likelihood of commission scores mirrored results
using verdicts. Higher cognitive accuracy scores and higher honesty scale scores predicted more
guilty verdicts.
In contrast, when examining results of the manipulations of cognitive accuracy and
honesty, only cognitive accuracy was found to have an effect on likelihood of commission
scores. Differences existed only between scores in the neutral cognitive accuracy condition and
scores in the medium condition. It may be that the degree of change between having one
inconsistency on the stand versus three inconsistencies was negligible; jurors may already
perceive one inconsistency as enough to lower their confidence in the witness’s testimony and
thus find the defendant less culpable. Further, unlike verdicts, jurors did not take into account
prior criminal history when deciding likelihood of commission scores. When examining average
likelihood of commission scores of the honesty conditions, there was a decrease in scores as
jurors are given evidence that the witness has one or three prior criminal convictions; however,
the decrease was not large enough to reach statistical significance.

Future Research
The current study was a first step in defining adult witness credibility. Future research is
needed in order to expand this definition as needed. It may be beneficial to examine additional
factors that help explain adult witness credibility. For example, research on source credibility
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sometimes finds bias to be a relevant factor of credibility. In research on journalism credibility,
balance/fairness/bias was found to be one of the significant factors resulting from a factor
analysis examining newspaper, television, and online news sources (Abdulla, Garrison, Salwen,
Driscoll, & Casey, 2005). Scale items of the bias factor included reporting the whole story, fair,
bias, and objective. In addition, Whitehead (1968) also identified a factor that he labeled
objectivity; items included: open-minded, objective and impartial. The current study did include
an item of bias, but it did not load at all onto its hypothesized factor of cognitive accuracy and a
second test showed it also did not load onto the honesty factor. It may be that this item loads onto
a third factor that was not measured in the current study. Additional bias items were not included
in factor analyses of child or expert witness credibility (Brodsky et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2003);
however, instructions to juries on how to evaluate witness credibility do include a note on
considering any biases that might unduly influence the truthfulness of witness’s statements
(“Criminal Jury Instructions,” n.d.). Future research should examine this factor as it relates to
witness credibility. More items mirroring those mentioned above could be added to an
experimental credibility scale and another factor analysis could be conducted to test for a third
factor of bias.
In order to further validate the scales found in the current study, future research should
examine other manipulations of cognitive accuracy and honesty. In hindsight, the current study
may have confounded its manipulation of cognitive accuracy. In the trial transcript, the witness
made an error during testimony and the lawyer accused the witness of changing his story after
seeing the defendant’s appearance. Rather than pointing out a cognitive deficit such as the
witness’s memory, the lawyer’s dialogue may have been too focused on the witness’s honesty.
Perhaps a better manipulation of cognitive accuracy may be to focus on the witness’s lack of an
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accurate memory or lack of intelligence. Cognitive accuracy could also be manipulated to reflect
witnesses that are high or low in confidence. High witness confidence has been found to increase
jurors’ credibility judgments (Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986); in one case,
confidence was even found to be more influential than inconsistencies when jurors were making
credibility judgments (Brewer & Burke, 2002). Therefore, manipulating cognitive accuracy
through witness confidence may lead to results similar to those found in the current study.
Intelligence, on the other hand, has not been studied as it relates to witness credibility. While it
has been included as an item on credibility scales or factor analyses (Brodsky et al., 2010; Ruva
& Bryant, 2004), effects of intelligence manipulations on credibility ratings have not yet been
examined. It may be hypothesized that jurors believe intelligence is linked to memory and other
cognitive functions and consequently, high intelligence will lead to higher cognitive accuracy
scores. Intelligence could be manipulated by introducing academic or career achievements or
lack thereof.
It would also be beneficial to explore additional manipulations of the honesty component.
Honesty could be manipulated to reflect witnesses that have a history of lying but have not
received a criminal conviction, such as unfaithfulness in a relationship or lying to further one’s
career. While still expected to have an effect on the honesty scale, dishonest witnesses without
criminal convictions may produce smaller deficits on the scale compared to those with criminal
convictions.
More research is also needed in order to determine whether the definition of credibility
found here extends to other types of crimes. The current study focused on eyewitness testimony
during a criminal trial of a defendant charged with burglary of a habitation. While two factors of
witness credibility were successfully identified and scales for each factor were created, it would
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be beneficial to test these scales across a variety of criminal and civil trial transcripts. There may
be unique cases of criminal trials in which the witness credibility factor structure may differ, or
one factor has a greater influence on verdicts than the other. For example, cases involving sexual
assault in which the witness is also the victim may lead jurors to alter their judgments of
credibility. Ross et al. (2003) examined child witnesses/victims testifying about an incident of
sexual assault they experienced. The authors found the cognitive component of credibility had
little impact on verdicts. Jurors hearing about adult witnesses/victims that experienced a sexual
assault may be influenced only by honesty when deciding verdicts. Civil trials are also an understudied area in legal psychology and it would be interesting to examine witness credibility from
this angle.
Finally, as previously mentioned, the current study was designed based on contradictory
findings from Moore and Scullin (2010). In that study, witness credibility was measured by
averaging ratings of believability, honesty, and trustworthiness. This was problematic because
when analyses were conducting using each item as the dependent variable, results were different
compared to using the average of the items as the dependent variable. Based on the results of the
current study, the problem may have been both the manipulation of credibility and the scale of
credibility. Moore and Scullin (2010) manipulated witness confidence and inconsistencies in
testimony. The current study showed that witness credibility has two factors and inconsistencies
in testimony have a greater effect on the cognitive component of witness credibility. It can also
be hypothesized that confidence may have a greater effect on the cognitive component of
credibility as well. Therefore, Moore and Scullin (2010) manipulated cognitive components of
credibility, but only measured honesty components. This may explain the contradictory results
when individual scale items versus the average of the scale items were used as the dependent
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variable. The study should be replicated using the current study’s credibility scales. More
sophisticated analyses of latent variable means can then be conducted to examine changes in
credibility ratings based on inconsistencies and confidence.

Practical Application
The main goal in identifying factors of credibility was to provide researchers with a valid,
internally reliable measure of credibility that can be consistently used across studies. If
credibility is consistently measured, researchers can better identify witness characteristics that
cause changes in credibility. Because credibility is currently measured with so many different,
un-validated scales, it is difficult to interpret results between studies. While one study may find
confidence to be influential to credibility judgments (Whitley & Greenberg, 1986), others find
inconsistencies to be more influential (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman et al., 1995). By creating
a validated and reliable scale of adult credibility, it will be easier to compare studies across
researchers and labs and to pinpoint witness characteristics that have the greatest effect on
credibility judgments.
With validated credibility scales, researchers will also be able to compare credibility
across witness groups. For example, credibility between children and adult eyewitnesses can be
examined for important differences; credibility between adult witnesses and jailhouse informants
could also be compared. The current study has already indentified one important difference
between child and adult witnesses – cognitive competence is more valued in adult witnesses than
in child witnesses. More differences may be found when comparing adult witnesses to jailhouse
informants. Research has found that even though jurors rate informants as less trustworthy than
traditional witnesses, this discrepancy does not translate to a decrease in convictions for
defendants that informants are testifying against (Neuschatz, Lawson, Swanner, Meissner, &
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Neuschatz, 2008). When looking at these results from a credibility and factor analysis standpoint,
one might hypothesize that while honesty may be a factor of informant credibility, it does not
influence verdicts. In this case, it would be especially interesting to examine a possible third
factor of bias and analyze its influence on verdicts. Regardless, jurors appear to judge credibility
differently depending on the type of witness heard during the trial. It is important to examine
factors and scales of credibility across all type of witnesses in order to pinpoint the key
differences.
A second goal of the current study was to inform lawyers about components of credibility
based on statistical evidence. As mentioned previously, there seems to be anecdotal evidence
amongst lawyers that credibility has several components relating to cognitive ability and honesty
(Kane, 2007; McElhaney, 1992; McElhaney, 2002). The current study provides statistical
evidence that this is indeed the case. Further, jurors appear to be most influenced by negative
rather than positive character traits, with dishonesty having more of an effect than a lack of
cognitive accuracy. Multiple instances of negative traits also have a cumulative negative effect
on credibility judgments. In order for their witnesses to be viewed as most credible in the jury’s
eyes, lawyers should minimize negative honesty traits that may be introduced and minimize the
number of inconsistencies in testimony witnesses may have during the trial.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table 8: Inter-correlation between Scale Items
General
Accuracy

Ability to
Remember
and Answer
Questions

General
Memory

Confident

WellSpoken

Cognitive
Functioning

Consistent

SelfAssured

Intelligent

Trustworthy

.851

.727

.816

.726

.682

.717

.695

.651

.757

Genuine

.762

.681

.687

.647

.701

.705

.660

.637

.727

Honor

.705

.622

.637

.565

.616

.640

.609

.505

.695

Sincere

.713

.619

.615

.607

.672

.650

.609

.559

.682

Honest

.708

.592

.667

.609

.596

.628

.605

.515

.752

Likeable

.776

.675

.699

.669

.703

.700

.637

.647

.741

Ethical

.728

.647

.653

.609

.654

.651

.611

.564

.708

Believable

.801

.681

.748

.690

.643

.688

.656

.615

.778

Moral

.651

.582

.543

.530

.588

.605

.580

.460

.650
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Table 9: Covariances of Items in the Revised Model
General
Accuracy

Ability to
Remember
and Answer
Questions

General
Memory

Confident

WellSpoken

Cognitive
Functioning

Consistent

SelfAssured

Intelligent

General Accuracy

6.75

Ability to
Remember and
Answer Questions

5.60

7.22

General Memory

5.36

5.14

6.17

Confident

5.57

5.72

5.21

8.12

Well-Spoken

4.83

5.10

4.39

5.13

6.11

Cognitive
Functioning

4.59

4.66

4.16

4.49

4.38

5.31

Consistent

5.41

6.60

5.23

5.96

4.94

4.58

8.42

Self-Assured

4.76

5.14

4.37

5.85

4.73

4.08

5.26

6.50

Intelligent

3.87

3.53

4.05

4.15

3.68

3.50

3.82

3.26

4.63

General
Accuracy

Ability to
Remember
and Answer
Questions

General
Memory

Confident

WellSpoken

Cognitive
Functioning

Consistent

SelfAssured

Intelligent

Trustworthy

5.48

4.83

5.03

5.12

4.18

4.06

4.96

4.10

4.03

Genuine

4.69

4.33

4.10

4.39

4.12

3.84

4.54

3.88

3.73

Honor

4.54

4.10

3.94

4.00

3.78

3.66

4.35

3.20

3.72

Sincere

4.56

4.11

3.81

4.23

4.11

3.72

4.33

3.53

3.62

Honest

4.36

3.72

3.99

4.12

3.49

3.45

4.09

3.12

3.85

Likeable

4.87

4.34

4.21

4.60

4.20

3.86

4.38

3.99

3.86

Ethical

4.42

4.07

3.79

4.07

3.79

3.50

4.10

3.38

3.55

Believable

5.27

4.62

4.71

4.98

4.03

4.03

4.81

3.98

4.24

Moral

3.92

3.60

3.14

3.47

3.36

3.21

3.86

2.66

3.20

62

Table 9 Cont’d: Covariances of Items in the Revised Model
SinTrustworthy Genuine
Honor
Honest
cere
Trustworthy
6.13

Likeable

Ethical

Believable

Genuine

4.62

5.62

Honor

4.60

4.90

6.08

Sincere

4.48

4.72

4.91

6.12

Honest

4.75

4.24

4.64

4.40

5.66

Likeable

4.75

4.53

4.29

4.43

4.20

5.81

Ethical

4.46

4.32

4.39

4.50

4.08

4.12

5.47

Believable

5.19

4.34

4.34

4.47

4.80

4.59

4.14

6.40

Moral

4.00

4.23

4.60

4.54

4.10

3.74

4.11

3.83

*Note: Covariances reported above were computed on the original data set that contained missing data.
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Moral

5.34

Table 10: Item Means and Standard Deviations
Item
Mean (SD)
General Accuracy
4.33 (2.60)
Ability to Remember and
Answer Questions

4.92 (2.69)

General Memory

4.27 (2.48)

Confident

5.08 (2.85)

Well-Spoken

5.02 (2.47)

Cognitive Functioning

4.78 (2.30)

Consistent

4.85 (2.90)

Self-Assured

4.97 (2.55)

Intelligent
Trustworthy

5.06 (2.15)
4.31 (2.48)

Genuine

4.99 (2.37)

Honor

4.73 (2.47)

Sincere

5.15 (2.47)

Honest

5.10 (2.38)

Likeable

4.61 (2.41)

Ethical

4.83 (2.34)

Believable

4.77 (2.53)

Moral

5.24 (2.31)

*Note: Means and standard deviations reported above were computed on the original data set that contained missing
data.
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Appendix B: Voir Dire Questionnaire
Demographic Information:
Age:

Gender:

Ethnicity:

Years Lived in El Paso:
Licensed Driver: Yes

No

Registered Voter: Yes

No

Marital Status: Married___ Never Married___

Divorced

Widowed

If Married: Years Married
If You Have Children: Number of Children:
Your Occupation and Employer:
Name of Last School or College Attended, Grade Completed, or Degree Received:

What is (was) the principal profession or vocation of your parents?
Father:

Mother:

Your religious preference (if any):
Experiences with the Legal System:
In this section, you will be asked some general questions about your personal experiences with
the legal system. Please answer these questions honestly. Again, please remember that these
answers are completely anonymous.
Have you served on a jury before? Yes

No

If yes, how many times?
Was it Civil

; Criminal

Was a verdict rendered? Yes

; Grand Jury

?

No

Are you now or have you ever been a law enforcement officer? Yes
If yes, state what type and when:
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No

___

Do you have a close friend or relative who is now or ever has been a law enforcement officer?
Yes

_ No ____
If yes, state the nature of the relationship, type of law enforcement officer, and when the
individual was (is) a law enforcement officer:

Have you ever been a victim of a crime? Yes

No

If yes, state the nature of the crime and when it occurred:
Has any close friend or relative ever been the victim of a crime? Yes

No

If yes, state the nature of the crime and when it occurred:
Have you ever been a witness in a criminal case? Yes

No ____

If yes, state the type of case and when it occurred:
Do you have a close friend or relative who is now or ever has been an attorney?
Yes

_ No ____
If yes, state the nature of the relationship, type of attorney, and when the individual was
(is) practicing law:

Overall, how do you feel about police officers? (Circle one)
-3

-2

-1

Very
Negative

0

1

Neutral

Have you ever spoken with a police officer? Yes
If yes, how many times?
Once or twice
A few times
Several times
Many times
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2

3
Very
Positive

_ No ____

If yes, in what contexts? (check all that apply)
Speeding ticket / traffic accident
Answering questions about something I had seen
Answering questions about something I may have done
Answering questions about something that happened to me
Talking about general issues or concerns such as safety
In a social context
Other (please explain)
Have you ever reported a crime to the police? Yes __ No ____
Overall, how do you feel about lawyers? (Circle one)\
-3

-2

-1

Very
Negative

0

1

Neutral

Have you ever spoken with a lawyer? Yes ___

2

3
Very
Positive

No ____

If yes, how many times?
Once or twice
A few times
Several times
Many times
If yes, in what contexts? (check all that apply)
Answering questions about something I had seen
Getting advice on a civil matter, such as a divorce, will, or lawsuit
Getting advice on a criminal matter
Lawyer called me to offer services
In a social context
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Other (please explain)
Please mark an “X” beside the statement that best describes your behavior.
a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

I read the newspaper.
Never

1-3 times per week

Less than once per month

4-6 times per week

Less than once per week

Everyday

I watch television news.
Never

1-3 times per week

Less than once per month

4-6 times per week

Less than once per week

Everyday

I watch television shows about the police or legal system.
Never

1-3 times per week

Less than once per month

4-6 times per week

Less than once per week

Everyday

I read books about the police or legal system.
Never

5-6 times per year

1-2 times per year

1 time per month

3-4 times per year

2 or more times per month

I see movies about the police or legal system.
Never

5-6 times per year

1-2 times per year

1 time per month

3-4 times per year

2 or more times per month
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Appendix C: Trial Transcript
PEOPLE v. MIGUEL KLOB
Thank you for participating in this research project. We are interested in examining how
jurors evaluate evidence and make judgments about legal cases. We would like you to serve as a
juror and make decisions about a legal case involving the burglary of a dorm room of a college
student at Williams College, a private liberal arts college in Texas. Below you will find a brief
description of the incident and a summary of some of the crucial elements of the trial. Only
material which is redundant or superficial has been omitted. Please read this transcript carefully
and when you are done, place it in the folder and move on to the next worksheet. Ask the
experimenter for clarification if you have any questions.
THE INCIDENT:
At approximately 9:30pm on Wednesday, March 4th, 2011, Eduardo Lopez, sophomore at
Williams College, returned to his dormitory after meeting with an economics study group. As he
approached his room, he was surprised to discover that his door was ajar. He rushed into the
room and found he’d been burglarized. The place was in complete disarray; his dresser drawers
had been ransacked, crates and boxes were overturned, and clothing, books, and papers were
scattered all over the floor. A frantic inventory revealed that several valuable possessions had
been stolen.
After a brief tantrum, Eduardo regained his composure and called the college’s
Department of Public Safety to notify them that his dorm room had been burglarized. The DPS
officers arrived at about 9:50pm, searched the room, but were not able to find clear fingerprints
or other clues to the suspect’s identity. The DPS officers then surveyed the dorm residents to
determine if any of the might have witnessed the burglary. One student, Victor Guzman, reported
seeing a Hispanic male in his mid 20’s [Low Cognitive Ability: about 5 feet 5 inches tall]
leaving Lopez’s dorm room earlier that evening carrying a laptop. Guzman claimed that the man
had [Neutral Cognitive Ability: blonde hair/Medium and Low Cognitive Ability: black
hair] and was wearing a [Neutral and Medium Cognitive Ability: dark jacket/Low Cognitive
ability: white t-shirt].
Minutes later, DPS officers found a tall, blonde-haired man wearing a blue denim jacket
in a parking lot on campus. The man, Miguel Reyes, age 24, was holding an iPod, which was one
of the items that Lopez reported at stolen. Reyes was not a student at the college; he claimed that
he was trying to visit a friend but wasn’t able to find him, and that he had found the iPod on the
ground in the parking lot. The DPS officers arrested him on charges of burglary of a habitation.
The next morning, DPS arranged a lineup. In the lineup were Reyes and five other
Hispanic men of approximately the same age and height. Guzman examined the lineup briefly
and then indicated that Reyes was the man he had seen leaving Lopez’s room. As a result,
Miguel Reyes was charged with burglary of a habitation.
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THE TRIAL:
Reyes was tried in Texas District Court for the charges of burglary of a habitation, after
he pled “not guilty.” In his opening statement, the prosecutor said that the evidence would reveal
that Miguel Reyes broke into Lopez’s room, and stole over $2,000 worth of personal property –
property that Lopez had worked long and hard to earn by holding down two summer jobs. The
prosecution would demonstrate that Reyes was identified by an eyewitness in a fair police
lineup, and that Reyes was unable to provide a verifiable alibi.
Next, Reyes’s defense attorney approached the jury and stated that he would convince
them that his client was an innocent victim of circumstance. He informed the jury that Reyes was
an ordinary young man who held a part-time job while taking classes at a local community
college. He acknowledged that his client was on the Williams College campus on the night of the
incident, but that Reyes was simply visiting the college to look up an old high school friend.
Unfortunately, his friend wasn’t around that evening, and while walking to his car, Reyes was
mistaken for the burglar, even though he’d never entered Eduardo Lopez’s dormitory. Finally,
the defense attorney stated that the prosecution’s eyewitness, though well-meaning, had
mistakenly identified Reyes as the perpetrator in the crime, allowing the true culprit to run free.
The prosecutor called Eduardo Lopez, the victim of the theft. Lopez was sworn in, and
was asked for some factual information about himself. Then the prosecutor asked him:
PROSECUTOR: Mr. Lopez, could you tell us where you went on the evening of Wednesday,
March 4th?
EDUARDO LOPEZ: Well, I was in my dorm room after dinner, but then I had to go to
Lassiter Hall to attend a study group for my Economics class. Well, my meeting started at
9pm, and I left maybe fifteen minutes early at about 8:45pm. I had to come back because
I forgot my notes, and that was around 9:15. That’s when I noticed everything was gone.
Q.

And what happened next?

A.

I found my door partially opened, so I ran in and found that I’d been ripped off. The place
was a mess. So I called DPS.

Q.

Could you tell us exactly what was stolen?

A.

About $150 in cash, an iPod, and my laptop.

[At this point, the Prosecutor presented receipts for the stolen goods which were admitted
as evidence.]
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Q.

Mr. Lopez, when you left your dorm room, did you lock your door?

A.

Yes, of course. I always do. But those dorm locks are worthless. Some guys who’ve
locked themselves out of their room have broken back in again using a credit card.

Q.

Thank you, Mr. Lopez.

The prosecutor called Victor Guzman to the stand. Guzman was sworn in and asked to
tell the jury some factual information about himself. Then the prosecutor asked him:
Q.

Victor, where were you on the night of Wednesday, March 4th?

A.

I was visiting a friend, Adan Chavez, in the dormitory. I got to Adan’s dorm room at
about 6pm and left around 9pm.

Q.

Do you live in the same dorm as Chavez?

A.

No, sir. I live about a mile from campus. When I left at 9, I was heading back home.

Q.

And did you see anything unusual in the dormitory as you were leaving?

A.

Well, as I got out of the elevator and was walking to the exit, I saw a man with black hair
and a dark jacket leaving Eduardo Lopez’s room with a laptop in his arms. At the time, I
thought it was a little fishy, but I don’t really know anyone else in the dorm very well so I
figured it was probably a friend of someone’s borrowing or buying the stuff, or maybe
just someone playing a prank.

Q.

And then what happened?

A.

I drove back to my house and watched TV until the DPS officers knocked on my door
and asked me if I’d seen anyone prowling around the dorm building. Adan told them I
would have been leaving the building about the time the stuff was stolen. So I told them
what I saw and later they called me back and asked me to come to the police lineup the
following morning.

Q.

And was the man you saw leaving Lopez’s room in the police lineup?

A.

Yes, he was.

Q.

And can you identify that same man in the courtroom today?
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A.

Yes, sir. (Points across courtroom at Reyes.)

Q.

Your Honor, may the record show that Mr. Guzman is pointing at the defendant, Mr.
Miguel Reyes? I have no further questions for this witness, Your Honor.
At this point, the defense attorney cross-examined the witness:

DEFENSE ATTORNEY:

Mr. Guzman, can you describe exactly what you saw?

VICTOR GUZMAN: A guy was coming out of the dorm room. He was in his early
twenties, with blonde hair, about 6 feet tall, and he was wearing a dark jacket and jeans.
Q.

[Medium and Low Cognitive Ability: You say that you saw a man with blonde hair
leaving Mr. Lopez’s dorm room, correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q:

And on the night of the robbery, you gave a written statement to police, and you
said the man had black hair, correct?

A:

I don’t know, now I’m confused.

Q.

[Low Cognitive Ability: A few moments ago you also said the man was wearing a
dark jacket and was 6 feet tall, correct?

A.

Yes, that’s correct.

Q.

But in your written statement to police on the night of the robbery, you said the man
was only wearing a t-shirt and was 5 feet 5 inches tall, correct?

A.

I’m not sure. I think so.]

Q:

Were you accurate in your description of the man in your written statement to the
police?

A;

Yes, sir.

Q:

Is it fair to say that your recollection of the events and what you saw that night was
better at that time than it is now?
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A:

I’m not sure.

Q:

Mr. Guzman, would you say that, in general, you have a poor memory? That you’re
not very good at recollecting details of events?

A:

Yes, sir. I often have trouble remember specific things that happen.

Q:

If that is the case, how can we be sure that your description of the suspect is
accurate?

A:

I think my original description of the suspect to the police was probably more
accurate.

Q:

And when you spoke with the police you were accurate because you wanted the
police to catch whoever burglarized that dorm room?

A;

Yes, sir.

Q:

And you wanted the victim to be able to recover his property that was stolen by
whomever burglarized that dorm room?

A:

Well, yes that would be nice. I’d like it if that was what had happened to me.

Q:

And you wouldn’t want to the police to arrest the wrong person, is that correct?

A:

Well, of course not.

Q.

So in that statement you gave the police, you told them that the man you saw had
black hair [Low Cognitive Ability: was 5 feet 5 inches tall and was wearing a tshirt], correct?

A.

I don’t remember saying that.

Q.

Do you recognize this document as the written statement you gave police?

A.

Yes, this is the statement.

Q.

And doesn’t your written statement say that the man had black hair [Low Cognitive
Ability: was 5 feet 5 inches tall and was wearing a t-shirt]?

73

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

So you only changed your story to say the man was blonde [Low Cognitive Ability: 6
feet tall, and wearing a jacket] after you found out that my client has blonde hair
[Low Cognitive Ability: and is 6 feet tall], correct?

A.

No, that’s not true.]

Q.

[Medium and Low Honesty: Have you ever been a criminal witness in a trial before?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When was this?

A.

About three years ago.

Q.

And during this trial, you claimed you saw a man burglarizing a convenience store.
After the trial was over, were you charged with a crime?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And after you were an eyewitness in that trial, also for burglary, you were charged
with lying under oath or perjury, isn’t that correct?

A.

Yes, sir. But I was unfairly treated. I didn’t lie.

Q.

You were given jail time and a $5,000 fine for lying under oath, correct?

A.

Yes, sir. But I still don’t agree with the charge.]

Q.

[Low Honesty: Isn’t it also true that you were arrested two separate times and
found guilty of theft and burglary two years ago?

A.

I was, but again, I was unfairly treated.

Q.

You were also given jail times for these crimes as well, correct?

A.

Yes, sir.]
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Q.

Okay Mr. Guzman, was there anything particularly unusual about the physical
appearance of the man you saw? Any especially distinct physical characteristics that
would make him stand out in a crowd?

A.

Well, no, not really. Not anything really unusual.

Q.

Aren’t there many men at Williams College and in the town that could be described as
being “in their early twenties, blonde, about 6 feet tall, with a dark jacket and jeans”?

A.

Yes, sir, but I recognize his face.

Q.

I have no further questions, Your Honor.
Next, the prosecutor called the Department of Public Safety Officer Daniel Holland to the

stand.
PROSECUTOR: Officer Holland, according to Mr. Lopez, the locks on the dormitory room
doors can be opened with a credit card. Based on your experience, is that true?
OFFICER HOLLAND: Yes, unfortunately, it’s true. We’ve been urging the college
administrators to replace the locks for several years. Perhaps now they will. We try to
keep an eye on all the dorm rooms at night, but we’re understaffed.
Q.

Based on your training and experience, would a person need to be a professional thief to
burglarize a room like Mr. Lopez’s?

A.

No, anyone who wanted to badly enough could probably do it.

[The prosecutor then asked Officer Holland about the events that occurred on the night of
the theft from the moment Lopez notified DPS.]
Q.

Can you tell us where you found Miguel Reyes, the defendant?

A.

Yes, we found him in the parking lot on the north side of the campus, unlocking his car
door.

Q.

Why did you suspect the defendant?

A.

Well, Victor Guzman described seeing a Hispanic man, about 6 feet tall, with blonde hair
and a dark jacket. Miguel Reyes is 5’11”, has blonde hair and was wearing a blue denim
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jacket. And he was holding an iPod, and we knew that such an item was stolen. So I
started asking him questions, and then my partner found the stolen goods nearby. And he
wasn’t from the school and couldn’t find anyone to provide an alibi for him.
Q.

And where did you find the stolen goods?

A.

They were in a large trash bag stuffed under a garbage dumpster behind the Student
Union building.

Q.

And how far away was the defendant’s parked car from the garbage dumpster, in your
estimation?

A.

Oh, about 90 feet away, around the corner of the building.

Q.

Thank you. No further questions, Your Honor.
Next the defense attorney cross-examined Officer Holland:

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Officer Holland, did you search for fingerprints in and around
Eduardo Lopez’s dorm room?
OFFICER HOLLAND:

Yes, sir, we did.

Q.

Did you find Miguel Reyes’s fingerprints anywhere?

A.

Well, no, we weren’t able to find his prints , but there were some partial prints that
weren’t clear enough for identification.

Q.

Do these partial prints indicate in any way that Miguel Reyes was in Eduardo Lopez’s
room?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

And did you find any prints on the stolen goods?

A.

We only found Eduardo Lopez’s prints on the stolen goods – but we believe that the
suspect probably wore gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints.

Q.

Thank you. No further questions.
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At this point, the defense attorney called the defendant, Miguel Reyes, to the stand. The
defense attorney asked him several questions about his family, his job, and his girlfriend.
Examination proceeded as follows:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:

Miguel, could you tell us what happened on the night of March 4th?

MIGUEL REYES: Yes sir. I decided I wanted to see how my old high school friend,
Richard Torres, was doing because we had kind of lost touch in the past few years –
you know, just doing different things and everything. So I drove over to campus and
stopped by his dorm room but he wasn’t in. I waited for a little while in case he had just
stepped out for a minute. And then I headed back to the parking lot. As I was walking to
my car, I saw an iPod on the ground by a garbage dumpster, so I picked it up. I
thought maybe someone had thrown it away because it was broken, so I brought it over to
my car to look at it in the light and see how badly broken it was and if there was a name
on it or something. And then all of a sudden the police officers come over and tell me that
I’m under arrest for a robbery that I didn’t have anything to do with.
Q.

Thank you, Mr. Reyes.
Then the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant:

PROSECUTOR: Mr. Reyes, you say that you were on the college campus to visit an old
friend. Did your friend know you were coming to visit?
MIGUEL REYES:

No, sir. It was going to be kind of a surprise.

Q.

I see. When you arrived on campus, how did you know where his dorm room was
located?

A.

I looked it up in a campus phone book in the Student Union building.

Q.

And is there anyone who can testify that you were in the Union looking up your friend’s
address?

A.

No, sir, there wasn’t anyone around at the time. It was pretty quick.

Q.

And was there anyone in his dorm that can testify that you were knocking on his door?

A.

No, sir, I guess everyone was in their rooms at the time.
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Q.

Thank you, Mr. Reyes. I have no further questions, Your Honor.
Next, the defense attorney called Richard Torres to the stand.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Mr. Torres, you are currently a senior at Williams College and you
live on campus, is that correct?
RICHARD TORRES:

Yes sir.

Q.

Do you know the defendant, Miguel Reyes?

A.

Yes, I do. We went to high school together. He was a senior when I was a freshman, and
we played on the wrestling team together for a year.

Q.

I see. Were you on campus the night of March 4th?

A.

No, sir. I was in Houston that evening, for a rock concert, and then I spent the night at a
friend’s apartment in the city.

Q.

Would you say that Miguel Reyes was the kind of friend that might just drop by for a
visit without calling first?

A.

Well, I guess so. We’re both pretty informal about things like that. He doesn’t live that
far from campus so it’d be no big deal.

Q.

Have you ever known Miguel Reyes to be the kind of person who might commit a crime?

A.

No he’s not the kind of person, not at all.

Q.

Thank you, Mr. Torres.
The prosecution then cross-examined the witness:

PROSECUTOR:

Mr. Torres, has Miguel Reyes ever visited you on campus before?

RICHARD TORRES:

No, sir.

Q.

And when was the last time that you saw him?

A.

Well, I guess it was awhile ago – during the spring of my first year of college.
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Q.

And where did you see him?

A.

In town, at a party.

Q.

So you really had no reason to expect a visit from Mr. Reyes this spring, did you?

A.

Well, no, but he knows he’d always be welcome to – we’ve both just been real busy with
work and school and girlfriends and things.

Q.

Thank you Mr. Torres. I think that will be all.

After the close of evidence at trial, each attorney made a closing statement. The
prosecution argued that the eyewitness testimony clearly established that Miguel Reyes was the
person who committed the crime. Reyes was on campus during the crime, he met the description
given by the eyewitness, he had the stolen iPod in his possession, and he emphasized the fact that
Reyes was unable to corroborate his alibi and that it seemed suspicious that Reyes would
suddenly drop in on his acquaintance unannounced after a two year lapse.
The defense attorney argued that Miguel Reyes was an innocent man who was simply in
the wrong place at the wrong time, and he asked the jury to consider the possibility that the
eyewitness was mistaken. He pointed out that most people would pick up an iPod if they saw it
lying on the road near a dumpster. He also reminded the jury that the DPS officers were unable
to identify Reyes using fingerprint analyses, and that many young men would meet the same
physical description as Reyes.
Finally, the judge instructed the jury. Portions of his instructions follow:
“Members of the jury, it is now my function to instruct you on the law that you must
apply to the facts that you find in this case. Under our system, a defendant is presumed to
be innocent until his guilt is proven. No inference against a defendant may be drawn from
the fact that he has been arrested and placed on trial. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
proof that leaves you with an firm belief that the charge is true. The evidence need not
eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. Now in this case, the charge is burglary of a habitation, and the
questions that you must decide is whether or not the defendant is the person who
burglarized Eduardo Lopez’s dorm room. If you believe that the prosecution has
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed
this act, then you must find him Guilty. However, if you believe that there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether the defendant is the person who committed this act, then you must
find him Not Guilty.”
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Appendix D: Verdict Form

1. For the charge of Burglary of a Habitation,

I find the defendant GUILTY of burglary of a habitation.

I find the defendant NOT GUILTY of burglary of a habitation.

2. How confident are you in your verdict decision of guilty or not guilty? (Circle one)

1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Completely

Stop here if you checked Not Guilty
____________
Continue ONLY if you checked GUILTY.
If you found the defendant GUILTY, for how many years would you sentence the defendant?
The sentencing guideline in the State of Texas for this offense of Second Degree Felony of
Burglary of a Habitation is punishment by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and no less
than 2 years. In addition, the defendant, if charged, may be punished by a fine not to exceed
$10,000.
My sentence is:

Years and $

Fine (optional)
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Appendix E: Post Verdict Questionnaire
For the following questions, please read each one carefully and circle the number the best
corresponds to your answer.
1. How accurate was the witness, Victor Guzman, in his description of the suspect in
this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

2. In your opinion, how honest is Victor Guzman?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

3. How believable did you find Victor Guzman’s testimony to be in this trial?
1
4. all
Not at

2

3

4

5

6

7
Completely

7. In your opinion, how intelligent is the witness, Victor Guzman?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

8. In general, how good is Victor Guzman’s memory?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

9. How trustworthy did you find the witness, Victor Guzman to be in this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

10. In your opinion, how confident was Victor Guzman?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

6

7
Completely
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11. To what extent, if any, do you believe Victor Guzman intentionally made up the
story that he saw the defendant in his dorm?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

12. Did you find Victor Guzman to be very self-assured during the trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

13. In general, did you find Victor Guzman to be accurate?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

14. How likeable did you find the witness, Victor Guzman to be in this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

15. Does Victor Guzman have a high cognitive functioning ability?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

16. Did you find Victor Guzman to be well-spoken during the trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

17. How suggestible was Victor Guzman in this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

18. In your opinion, how ethical is the witness, Victor Guzman?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

6

7
Completely
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19. Do you think Victor Guzman is a reliable source of information?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

20. Did you find Victor Guzman to be poised during the trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

21. How sincere did you find Victor Guzman to be in this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

22. In general, does the witness, Victor Guzman have a strong sense of morality?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

23. How good was Victor Guzman’s memory for the appearance of the suspect he saw?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

24. In your opinion, is Victor Guzman honorable?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

25. How genuine did you find Victor Guzman to be in this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

26. Do you believe the witness, Victor Guzman, was biased in this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

6

7
Completely
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27. Did Victor Guzman seem to be confused during his testimony in this trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

28. In your opinion, how competent is Victor Guzman?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

29. How consistent was Victor Guzman’s testimony? That is, did he always tell the same
story while testifying?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

30. In general, how well did the witness, Victor Guzman, appear to be able to think,
remember, and answer the questions the lawyer asked?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

31. How good was Victor Guzman’s memory for the events he testified about in this
trial?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

32. To what extent, if any, did Victor Guzman’s testimony influence your opinion on
whether or not the defendant committed the crime?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
Completely

33. What is the likelihood that the defendant, Miguel Reyes committed the crime of
burglary of a habitation? (Circle one)
0%
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